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Hunt (2012) builds on his work concerning ethics and resource-advantage theory to link personal 
ethical standards, societal norms, and economic growth but offers few details concerning the pre-
cise mechanisms that link ethics and growth.  This comment suggests a number of such mecha-
nisms – for example, the influence of prevailing ethical norms on the aggregate elasticity of substi-
tution and, therefore, total factor productivity and growth. 
Introduction
In “Trust, Personal Moral Codes, and the Resource-
Advantage Theory of Competition: Explaining Pro-
ductivity, Economic Growth, and Wealth Creation,” 
Professor Shelby D. Hunt addresses what should rightly 
be one the key questions in social science – namely, the 
aggregate implications of ethical beliefs and judgments 
that, while having an obvious collective-level dimen-
sion, are in the end held by individuals. Important phi-
losophers and economists may have been preoccupied 
with this issue – David Hume, Adam Smith, Frank 
Knight and Friedrich Hayek come to mind – but one 
rarely to witnesses a management (marketing) scholar 
offer important reflections on the matter. Hunt rightly 
notes that “…a consensus is developing that societal-
level moral codes that promote social trust promote 
wealth creation” and sets out to “…contribute to our 
understanding of the nature of the kinds of societal-
level moral codes that are thought to promote social 
trust,” as well as examine the mechanisms that link 
trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes to wealth 
creation (Hunt, 2012, p. 1). He seeks to account for 
these mechanisms in terms of the resource-advan-
tage theory of firms and competition, which he has 
pioneered in marketing research and may be loosely 
described as resource-based theory that explicitly ac-
counts for heterogeneous demand dynamics. 
 I believe Hunt is absolutely on the right track in his 
attempt to construct a complex, multi-level story of the 
influence of the so-called “informal,” but all-important 
institutional structures of society on the overall well-
being of society. It also makes much sense to link this 
work to work in moral philosophy, notably descrip-
tive ethics. Ethics is, of course, a perennial classic of 
philosophy, and any moral philosopher worth his salt 
has been aware of the social functions and ramifica-
tions of ethics. Finally, I agree that understanding the 
influence of morals on wealth creation requires that at-
tention be paid to the dynamic nature of competition. 
Thus, I do not register any disagreements with Hunt 
on the overall level. (I may disagree here and there on 
interpretive issues, e.g., in connection with neoclas-
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sical economics, but I consider those disagreements 
insubstantial in the larger picture.) However, I think 
Hunt’s theory requires greater attention to detail and 
“modelling” in the sense of more carefully accounting 
for theoretical mechanisms. In the spirit of construc-
tive criticism, I offer various suggestions that may add 
some content to Hunt’s theory in places where I feel 
this is needed. I organise my comments under the two 
headings of “Growth Economics and Societal Ethical 
Norms” and “Heterogeneous Resources, Transaction 
Cost, and Ethics.” 
Growth Economics and Societal 
Ethical Norms
The economics of growth has been primarily con-
cerned with labour growth and capital accumulation 
as the main drivers of growth, accounting for unex-
plained technological progress as an add-on, albeit an 
essential one (Solow, 1956). Solow’s (1957) empirical 
finding that most growth is caused by exogenous fac-
tors stimulated the emergence of growth accounting 
as a sub-field in economics and made endogenising 
technological progress a pressing issue on the re-
search agenda of the profession (partly achieved by 
Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990). A fundamental insight that 
emerged from this body of work is that a key reason 
why countries differ in terms of development is rooted 
in their different levels of productivity: Countries grow 
not only by deploying more inputs to production but 
also by better allocating resources and introducing 
productivity-enhancing innovations (Temple, 1999). 
The notion of “total factor productivity” accounts for 
those changes in total output not caused by changes in 
“traditional” inputs, such as labour and capital. While 
often treated as a residual, total factor productivity is 
by no means unimportant. For example, Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that differences in to-
tal factor productivity are the primary determinant 
of growth differences in a cross-country sample from 
1960 to 1985. In turn, an emerging literature has be-
gun exploring the “deeper” determinants of growth, 
that is, which factors cause differences in total factor 
productivity. 
It has long been recognised that the institutional 
matrix impacts economic growth by influencing, for 
example, individuals’ incentives to expend work effort 
and accumulate capital rather than enjoy leisure (e.g., 
North, 1990; Glaeser, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer, 
2004). Less interest has been devoted to understanding 
how the institutional matrix impacts total factor pro-
ductivity, that is, output changes that are not caused by 
changes in the “traditional” (measured) inputs of la-
bour and capital. Increasingly, institutions capture the 
interest of growth economists, and some scholars (e.g., 
Rodrik, Subramaniam, and Trebbi, 2004) go so far as 
to claim that “institutions rule”: Institutional quality 
overwhelms other determinants of growth. 
A main reason to expect institutional quality to pos-
itively affect growth is that institutional quality entails 
lower transaction costs through reduced uncertainty 
in economic transactions and productivity-enhancing 
incentives. As North explains, “[t]he major role of in-
stitutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by estab-
lishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure 
to human interaction. The overall stability of an insti-
tutional framework makes complex exchange possible 
across both time and space” (North, 1990, p. 6). In 
turn, higher certainty implies lower transaction costs, 
as the costs of entering into, bargaining for, monitor-
ing and protecting contractual and ownership rights 
are reduced. This development increases the expected 
value of projects, which increases the likelihood that 
such projects are undertaken. By offering incentives 
for productive behaviour, efficient institutions stimu-
late individuals to engage in those actions for which 
the private return resembles the social return.
Thus, institutions can be taken into account 
through, for example, arguments such as that which 
is provided above (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2012). However, 
there are certainly important dimensions to the impact 
of institutions on economic growth that are not easily 
captured by traditional measures of institutions. Hunt 
(2012) places much emphasis on trust, which is in-
deed important. In terms of the argument concerning 
the reduction of transaction costs entailed by “good” 
institutions, trust eases transactions and increases 
investment incentives. There are additional effects, 
however, of a “good” ethical societal matrix that may 
stimulate economic growth: Helping behaviours and 
other pro-social behaviours, while not easily reduced 
to transaction cost issues, are greatly influenced by the 
prevailing ethical matrix in a society (Bowles, 1998). 
If ethical norms assist in establishing and maintain-
ing generalised reciprocity norms and “good Samari-
6 Nicolai J. Foss1
10.5709/ce.1897-9254.46DOI: CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS
Vol. 6 Issue 3 4-92012
tan” norms, this relationship furthers trust and may 
save resources to the extent that Samaritans and other 
benevolent institutions of civil society can substitute 
for an often inefficient state apparatus financed by 
growth-reducing taxes.  Helping behaviours entail that 
information and knowledge, for example, is effectively 
shared and transmitted at low costs to the benefit of 
the growth process. Other aspects of the ethical matrix 
may also positively influence growth. As Hayek (1973) 
observed, generalised norms that recommend celibacy 
(e.g., the American Shakers) are not exactly conducive 
to long-run growth. Norms that encourage individuals 
to have more children are conducive to growth (ceteris 
paribus) because an increasing population allows for 
an increasing division of labour, which, as Adam Smith 
observed, is conducive to growth.  Stable families and 
low divorce rates may also be conducive to growth, as 
both-parent families tend to be better positioned to 
handle investments in education and may produce off-
spring less prone to become criminals. 
The discussion above suggests many reasons why we 
would expect prevailing ethical norms to influence eco-
nomic growth. While these reasons may not (yet) be an 
integral part of the economics of growth, the relevance 
of moral norms for society-level economic perfor-
mance has long been recognised in political philosophy 
and political economics and is increasingly recognised 
in social psychology and management research.  With 
respect to the latter, a rather large number of papers, 
not the least in international business research, rec-
ognise that there is cross-country variation in ethical 
norms (e.g., Langlois & Schegelmilch, 1990; Carroll 
& Gannon, 1997). This fact is recognised in manage-
ment research in fields that specialise in international 
human resource management and intercultural com-
munication and competence. Most of these papers may 
not directly link societal ethical norms to economic 
performance, but some do. Thus, Franke and Nadler 
(2008) proffer an index that measures “national ethi-
cal attitude,” which they define as people’s “cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural predispositions to react to is-
sues and activities involving social standards for what 
is morally proper and virtuous” (p.255). Such attitudes, 
in turn, derive from societal ethical norms. They link 
national ethical attitude, derived from the World Val-
ues Survey, to economic performance (GNP data) and 
show that national ethical attitude is a significant pre-
dictor of cross-country variation in GNP. Franke and 
Nadler may thus be seen as offering an empirical coun-
terpart to Hunt (2012) (although they do not make use 
of Hunt’s ethical classifications when discussing cross-
country variation in ethical attitudes). 
Heterogeneous Resources and 
Transaction Costs
Hunt’s reasoning involves a complex interplay of micro 
and macro levels. As he (Hunt, 2012, p. 13) explains: 
“If (at the micro-level) the primary objective of 
firms is superior financial performance (e.g. 
more profit than last year or a return on invest-
ment greater than one’s competitors), but (at the 
macro-level) a key factor distinguishing wealthy 
from nonwealthy societies is trust-promoting in-
stitutions, the challenge for any theory of markets 
and any dynamic theory of competition within 
markets is to explicate the process by which such 
macro-level, trust-promoting institutions as 
moral codes can contribute to (or from) firm-
level, superior financial performance.” 
Hunt’s seeks to explicate this process in terms of 
resource-advantage theory, building on the “founda-
tional premises” of that theory, which are the following 
(Hunt, 2012, p. 14):
P1. Demand is heterogeneous across industries, het-
erogeneous within industries, and    dynamic.
P2. Consumer information is imperfect and costly.
P3. Human motivation is constrained self-interest 
seeking.
P4. The firm’s objective is superior financial perfor-
mance.
P5. The firm’s information is imperfect and costly.
P6. The firm’s resources are financial, physical, legal, hu-
man, organisational, informational, and relational.
P7. Resource characteristics are heterogeneous and 
imperfectly mobile.
P8. The role of management is to recognise, understand, 
create, select, implement, and modify strategies.
P9. Competitive dynamics are disequilibrium-provok-
ing, with innovation endogenous.
Hunt spends considerable time explaining these prop-
ositions and perhaps too little time explaining how ex-
actly “R-A theory can explain how macro-level, trust-
promoting institutions such as personal moral codes 
can contribute to (or from) firm-level, superior finan-
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cial performance” and how this translates into positive 
contributions to the society-level growth process. 
Thus, Hunt reasons in terms of examples involving 
firms with employees who hold different ethical codes 
(because they are located in different geographical re-
gions, each characterised by different ethical norms) 
and simply argues that the firm-level analysis can be 
scaled up to the level of nations. 
Concerning the firm level, Hunt specifically argues 
that firms populated by utility-maximising conse-
quentialists will perform worse than firms populated 
by deontologists. I accept his overall conclusion, but 
Hunt does not explain much of the underlying logic. 
The argument holds true under a number of conditions 
that economists would summarise under the headings 
of incomplete contracting, imperfect enforcement, and 
asymmetric information (P5 of RA theory). If these im-
perfections do not hold, it is questionable whether there 
would be any performance differences between a firm 
populated by utility maximisers and one populated by 
deontologists, as easily enforceable perfect contracts 
could be implemented to achieve the same outcome in 
either firm. Moreover, there are subtle issues involving 
the endogeneity of employee preferences (Bowles, 1998) 
and goals (Lindenberg and Foss, 2011) that imply that 
firms can, to a certain extent, choose the moral orien-
tations of their employees. Hunt neglects these points, 
and this commentator, at least, would like to see them 
included in a rigorous RA logic.  
The problem of moving from the firm level to the 
national level is overcome simply by analogy: In the 
same way that one may perform a Gedanken experi-
ment with firms populated by employees with different 
ethical stances and examine their differential competi-
tiveness, nations may be characterised by the prevail-
ing societal ethical norms that hold similar implica-
tions for competitiveness, albeit at a much higher level 
of aggregation: 
“… just as employees having a moral code stress-
ing deontological ethics constitutes a firm re-
source, a society having a dominant culture with 
a moral code stressing deontological ethics has 
a societal resource upon which firms can draw.  
Thus, R-A theory—alone among theories of 
competition—can explain how such macro-level, 
informal institutions as moral codes can contrib-
ute to (or from) firm-level, superior financial 
performance.  In so doing, it contributes to ex-
plaining how societal institutions that promote 
social trust also promote the wealth of nations.”  
(Hunt, 2012, p. 16).
However, this procedure of aggregating by analogy, 
as it were, risks obscuring some of the key mecha-
nisms that drive the growth process. In what follows, 
I describe a view that, while consistent with Hunt’s 
theorising, is more explicit about the mechanisms that 
bring us down to the firm level from the macro level 
of societal ethical norms and up again to society level 
economic growth. 
Drawing on Austrian capital theory (e.g., Lach-
mann, 1956), Knight’s (1921) theory of entrepreneur-
ship, and the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 
1991) (all elements that could be argued to be part of 
or closely related to Hunt’s RA theory), Foss and Klein 
(2012) argue that transaction costs include the costs of 
entrepreneurs searching for, combining, and adapting 
heterogeneous resources in the pursuit of profit under 
uncertainty. The lower the transaction costs, the more 
such activity will take place. In turn, entrepreneurial 
experimentation with new combinations of heteroge-
neous resources is one of the drivers of growth. Draw-
ing on this understanding, Bjørnskov and Foss (2012) 
link the growth process to increases in total factor 
productivity resulting from new processes, new modes 
of organisation, better ways of allocating resources to 
preferred uses, and so on – that is, from processes in-
volving start-ups and the entrepreneurship exercised 
by established firms. 
Given this development, the flexibility with which 
such changes can be carried out becomes highly im-
portant. In terms of economic production theory, this 
flexibility is captured by the notion of the elasticity of 
factor substitution (Klump & De La Grandville, 2000) 
– that is, the percentage change in factor proportions 
due to a change in marginal rate of technical substitu-
tion (e.g., in the extreme example of a Leontieff tech-
nology, the elasticity is 0). At the level of a country, the 
(aggregate) elasticity of substitution is a measure of the 
flexibility of the economy with respect to, for example, 
external shocks. It is also clear that the elasticity of sub-
stitution is affected by a number of forces. For example, 
an argument for liberalising such trade is that this trade 
may expand the possibility set with respect to the input 
combinations faced by a country’s entrepreneurs. 
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This suggests that the elasticity of substitution is en-
dogenous (Arrow et al., 1961). Although certain inher-
ent technical constraints imply that resources will never 
be perfect substitutes, the aggregate elasticity of substi-
tution is to a large extent endogenous to institutional 
variables. Certain institutions promote a high elasticity 
of substitution, which in turn implies high factor pro-
ductivity because resources are more easily allocated 
to highly valued uses and new modes of organisation 
and new processes are more easily implemented. Un-
derlying the positive impact on factor productivity of 
high elasticity of substitution is a high degree of cer-
tainty in dealings and, therefore, low transaction costs 
of searching for contract partners, bargaining, and 
monitoring and enforcing contracts. Huge literatures 
in economic history concerning intellectual property 
rights and innovation stress the importance of well-
defined, enforced property rights for entrepreneurial 
activity at the micro level and economic development 
at the macro level (e.g., North, 1990). Well-defined and 
enforced property rights reduce the transaction costs 
of carrying out the entrepreneurial activities: Well-
defined property rights imply that contracting costs 
are relatively low, which implies low costs of searching 
for, negotiating with, and concluding bargains with the 
owners of those inputs that enter into entrepreneurial 
ventures. In short, the transaction costs of processes 
of resource mobilisation and orchestration are low. 
Moreover, well-defined and enforced income rights 
imply that the risk of undertaking entrepreneurial ac-
tivities is reduced, which may also stimulate the supply 
of entrepreneurship (Foss & Klein, 2012). Bjørnskov 
and Foss (2012) test these arguments, focusing on for-
mal institutional variables. 
However, it seems clear that informal institutions 
– notably, societal ethical codes – can similarly influ-
ence the aggregate elasticity of substitution and, there-
fore, total factor productivity. Morals that support 
more formal institutions of property and ownership 
evidently play such a role. However, morals that sup-
port pro-social behaviours in general may also play an 
important role. An economy characterised by a great 
deal of helping behaviours, civilised manners, and the 
like is also likely to be an economy with little friction, 
controversy, and destructive disagreement – one that 
promotes flexibility and adaptability, leading to higher 
total factor productivity.
Conclusions
Shelby Hunt has produced a characteristically stimulat-
ing paper that seeks to extend his RA theory. It is one 
among a number of papers over the last few years that 
have tried to link the informal institutions of society 
to the growth process. The purpose of this comment 
has been to note that some of the key mechanisms in 
Hunt’s new theory are deserving of elaboration. There 
are plenty of relevant insights from which to draw on 
in accomplishing this task. 
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